CSC 405 Computer Security


Reverse Engineering Part 1

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
Introduction

- Reverse engineering
 - process of analyzing a system
 - understand its structure and functionality
 - used in different domains (e.g., consumer electronics)
- Software reverse engineering
 - understand architecture (from source code)
 - extract source code (from binary representation)
 - change code functionality (of proprietary program)
 - understand message exchange (of proprietary protocol)

Software Engineering



Software Reverse Engineering



Going Back is Hard!

- Fully-automated disassemble/de-compilation of arbitrary machine-code is theoretically an **undecidable problem**
- Disassembling problems
 - hard to distinguish code (instructions) from data
- De-compilation problems
 - structure is lost
 - data types are lost, names and labels are lost
 - no one-to-one mapping
 - same code can be compiled into different (equivalent) assembler blocks
 - assembler block can be the result of different pieces of code

Why Reverse Engineering

- Software interoperability
 - Samba (SMB Protocol)
 - OpenOffice (MS Office document formats)
- Emulation
 - Wine (Windows API)
 - React-OS (Windows OS)
- Legacy software
 - Onlive
- Malware analysis
- Program cracking
- Compiler validation

Analyzing a Binary - Static Analysis

- Identify the file type and its characteristics
 - architecture, OS, executable format...
- Extract strings
 - commands, password, protocol keywords...
- Identify libraries and imported symbols
 - network calls, file system, crypto libraries
- Disassemble
 - program overview
 - finding and understanding important functions
 - by locating interesting imports, calls, strings...

Analyzing a Binary - Dynamic Analysis

- Memory dump
 - extract code after decryption, find passwords...
- Library/system call/instruction trace
 - determine the flow of execution
 - interaction with OS
- Debugging running process
 - inspect variables, data received by the network, complex algorithms..
- Network sniffer
 - find network activities
 - understand the protocol

- Gathering program information
 - get some rough idea about binary (file)

```
linux util # file sil
sil: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1
(SYSV), for GNU/Linux 2.6.9, dynamically linked (uses s
hared libs), not stripped
```

- strings that the binary contains (strings)

```
linux util # strings sil | head -n 5
/lib/ld-linux.so.2
_Jv_RegisterClasses
_gmon_start__
libc.so.6
puts
```

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Static Techniques

• Examining the program (ELF) header (elfsh)

[ELF HEADER]
[Object sil, MAGIC 0x464C457F]

Architecture	:	Intel 80386	ELF Version	:	1
Object type	:	Executable object	SHT strtab index	:	25
Data encoding	:	Little endian	SHT foffset	:	4061
PHT foffset	:	52	SHT entries number	:	28
PHT entries number	:	8	SHT entry size	:	40
PHT entry size		32	ELF header size	:	52
Entry point	:	0x8048500	[start]		
$\{PAX FLAGS = 0x0\}$		1			
PAX PAGEEXEC	:	Disabled	PAX EMULTRAMP	:	Not emulated
PAX MPROTECT	:	Restricted	PAX RANDMMAP	:	Randomized
PAX_RANDEXEC	:	Not randomized	PAX_SEGMEXEC	:	Enabled

Program entry point

- Used libraries

 easier when program is dynamically linked (ldd)

 linux util # ldd sil

 linux-gate.so.1 => (0xffffe000)
 libc.so.6 => /lib/libc.so.6 (0xb7e99000)
 /lib/ld-linux.so.2 (0xb7fcf000)
 - more difficult when program is statically linked

```
linux util # gcc -static -o sil-static simple.c
linux util # ldd sil-static
not a dynamic executable
linux util # file sil-static
sil-static: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1
(SYSV), for GNU/Linux 2.6.9, statically linked, not stripped
```

Looking at linux-gate.so.1

```
linux util # cat /proc/self/maps | tail -n 1
ffffe000-fffff000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0
                                               [vdso]
linux util # dd if=/proc/self/mem of=linux-gate.dso bs=4096 skip=1048574
count=1 2> /dev/null
linux util # objdump -d linux-gate.dso | head -n 11
linux-gate.dso: file format elf32-i386
Disassembly of section .text:
ffffe400 < kernel vsyscall>:
ffffe400:
               51
                                      push
                                             %ecx
               52
ffffe401:
                                      push
                                             %edx
               55
                                      push
                                             %ebp
ffffe402:
              89 e5
ffffe403:
                                             %esp,%ebp
                                      mov
ffffe405:
              0f 34
                                      sysenter
```

- Used library functions
 - again, easier when program is dynamically linked (nm -D)

linux util # nm -D sil | tail -n8
 U fprintf
 U fwrite
 U getopt
 U opendir
08049bb4 B optind
 U puts
 U readdir
08049bb0 B stderr

more difficult when program is statically linked

```
linux util # nm -D sil-static
nm: sil-static: No symbols
linux util # ls -la sil*
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root chris 8017 Jan 21 20:37 sil
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root chris 544850 Jan 21 20:58 sil-static
```

Recognizing libraries in statically-linked programs

- Basic idea
 - create a checksum (hash) for bytes in a library function
- Problems
 - many library functions (some of which are very short)
 - variable bytes due to dynamic linking, load-time patching, linker optimizations
- Solution
 - more complex pattern file
 - uses checksums that take into account variable parts
 - implemented in IDA Pro as:

Fast Library Identification and Recognition Technology (FLIRT)

- Program symbols
 - used for debugging and linking
 - function names (with start addresses)
 - global variables
 - use nm to display symbol information
 - most symbols can be removed with strip
- Function call trees
 - draw a graph that shows which function calls which others
 - get an idea of program structure

Displaying program symbols

```
linux util # nm sil | grep " T"
080488c7 T __i686.get_pc_thunk.bx
08048850 T __libc_csu_fini
08048860 T __libc_csu_init
08048904 T _fini
08048904 T _fini
08048500 T _start
08048500 T _start
080485cd T display_directory
080486bd T main
080485a4 T usage
linux util # strip sil
linux util # nm sil | grep " T"
nm: sil: no symbols
```

- Disassembly
 - process of translating binary stream into machine instructions
- Different level of difficulty
 - depending on ISA (instruction set architecture)
- Instructions can have
 - fixed length
 - more efficient to decode for processor
 - RISC processors (SPARC, MIPS)
 - variable length
 - use less space for common instructions
 - CISC processors (Intel x86)

- Fixed length instructions
 - easy to disassemble
 - take each address that is multiple of instruction length as instruction start
 - even if code contains data (or junk), all program instructions are found
- Variable length instructions
 - more difficult to disassemble
 - start addresses of instructions not known in advance
 - different strategies
 - linear sweep disassembler
 - recursive traversal disassembler
 - disassembler can be desynchronized with respect to actual code

- Linear sweep disassembler
 - start at beginning of code (.text) section
 - disassemble one instruction after the other
 - assume that well-behaved compiler tightly packs instructions
 - objdump -d uses this approach

Let's break LSD

```
#include <stdio.h>
```

```
int main() {
    printf("Hello, world!\n");
    return 0;
}
$ gcc hello.c -o hello
$ ./hello
Hello, world!
```

Objdump disassembly

0804840b <main>:</main>				
804840b:	8d 4	c 24	04	
804840f:	83 e	4 f0		
8048412:	ff 7	1 fc		
8048415:	55			
8048416:	89 e	5		
8048418:	51			
8048419:	83 e	c 04		
804841c:	83 e	c 0c		
804841f:	68 c	0 84	04	0 8
8048424:	e8 b	7 fe	ff	ff
8048429:	83 c	4 10		
804842c:	b8 0	0 00	00	00
8048431:	8b 4	d fc		
8048434:	с9			
8048435:	8d 6	1 fc		
8048438:	c3			

lea	0x4(%esp),%ecx
and	\$0xfffffff0,%esp
pushl	-0x4(%ecx)
push	%ebp
mov	%esp,%ebp
push	%ecx
sub	\$0x4,%esp
sub	\$0xc,%esp
push	\$0x80484c0
call	80482e0 <puts@plt></puts@plt>
add	\$0x10,%esp
mov	\$0x0,%eax
mov	-0x4(%ebp),%ecx
leave	
lea	-0x4(%ecx),%esp
ret	

\$ objdump -D hello

radare2 disassembly

```
[0x08048310]> pdf@main
/ (fcn) sym.main 46
          0x0804840b
                                    lea ecx, [esp+0x4]
                      8d4c2404
          0x0804840f
                      83e4f0
                                    and esp, 0xffffff0
          0x08048412 ff71fc
                                    push dword [ecx-0x4]
          0x08048415 55
                                    push ebp
          0x08048416 89e5
                                    mov ebp, esp
          0x08048418 51
                                    push ecx
          0x08048419 83ec04
                                    sub esp, 0x4
          0x0804841c 83ec0c
                                    sub esp, 0xc
          ; DATA XREF from 0x080484c0 (fcn.080484b8)
                                    push str.Helloworld ; 0x080484c0
          0x0804841f
                       68c0840408
           ; CODE (CALL) XREF from 0x080482e6 (fcn.080482e6)
           ; CODE (CALL) XREF from 0x080482f6 (fcn.080482f6)
           ; CODE (CALL) XREF from 0x08048306 (fcn.08048306)
          0x08048424
                        e8b7feffff
                                    call 0x1080482e0 ; (sym.imp.puts)
             sym.imp.puts(unk, unk, unk, unk)
          0x08048429 83c410
                                    add esp, 0x10
          0x0804842c b80000000
                                    mov eax, 0x0
          0x08048431 8b4dfc
                                    mov ecx, [ebp-0x4]
          0x08048434 c9
                                    leave
          0x08048435 8d61fc
                                    lea esp, [ecx-0x4]
          0x08048438
                      c3
                                    ret
```

Let's patch the program

\$ radare2 -Aw hello
[0x08048310]> 0x08048419
[0x08048419]> wx eb01 #(jmp 0x804841c)

We patched a 3-byte instruction with a 2-byte instruction. What is going to happen now with disassembly?!

Disassembly fails!



- Recursive traversal disassembler
 - aware of control flow
 - start at program entry point (e.g., determined by ELF header)
 - disassemble one instruction after the other, until branch or jump is found
 - recursively follow both (or single) branch (or jump) targets
 - not all code regions can be reached
 - indirect calls and indirect jumps
 - use a register to calculate target during run-time
 - for these regions, linear sweep is used
 - IDA Pro uses this approach

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.text:0804840B	; intcdecl ma	ain(int a	argc, const char	**	argv, const char **envp)
.text:0804840B		public m	nain		
.text:0804840B	main	proc nea	ir	;	DATA XREF: _start+17o
.text:0804840B	var_4	= dword	ptr -4		
.text:0804840B	argc	= dword	ptr 0Ch		
.text:0804840B	argv	= dword	ptr 10h		
.text:0804840B	envp	= dword	ptr 14h		
.text:0804840B		lea	ecx, [esp+4]		
.text:0804840F		and	esp, 0FFFFFFF0h		
.text:08048412		push	dword ptr [ecx-4	-]	
.text:08048415		push	ebp		
.text:08048416		mov	ebp, esp		
.text:08048418		push	ecx		
.text:08048419		jmp	short loc_804841	C	
.text:08048419	;				
.text:0804841B		db 4			
.text:0804841C	;				
.text:0804841C	loc_804841C:			;	CODE XREF: main+Ej
.text:0804841C		sub	esp, 0Ch		
.text:0804841F					"Hello, world!"
.text:08048424		push	offset s	;	Herro, worra:
		push call		;	
.text:08048429		call		;	
.text:08048429 .text:0804842C		call add	_puts	;	
		call add	_puts esp, 10h	-	
.text:0804842C		call add mov	_puts esp, 10h eax, 0	-	
.text:0804842C .text:08048431		call add mov mov leave	_puts esp, 10h eax, 0	-	
.text:0804842C .text:08048431 .text:08048434		call add mov mov leave	_puts esp, 10h eax, 0 ecx, [ebp+var_4]	-	nello, world:
.text:0804842C .text:08048431 .text:08048434 .text:08048435		call add mov mov leave lea	_puts esp, 10h eax, 0 ecx, [ebp+var_4]	-	

- General information about a process
 - /proc file system
 - /proc/<pid>/ for a process with pid <pid>
 - interesting entries
 - cmdline (show command line)
 - environ (show environment)
 - maps (show memory map)
 - fd (file descriptor to program image)
- Interaction with the environment
 - file system
 - network

- File system interaction
 - Isof
 - lists all open files associated with processes
- Windows Registry
 - regmon (Sysinternals)
- Network interaction
 - check for open ports
 - processes that listen for requests or that have active connections
 - netstat
 - also shows UNIX domain sockets used for IPC
 - check for actual network traffic
 - tcpdump
 - ethereal/wireshark

- System calls
 - are at the boundary between user space and kernel
 - reveal much about a process' operation
 - strace
 - powerful tool that can also
 - follow child processes
 - decode more complex system call arguments
 - show signals
 - works via the ptrace interface
- Library functions
 - similar to system calls, but dynamically linked libraries
 - Itrace

- Execute program in a controlled environment
 - sandbox / debugger
- Advantages
 - can inspect actual program behavior and data values
 - (at least one) target of indirect jumps (or calls) can be observed
- Disadvantages
 - may accidentally launch attack/malware
 - anti-debugging mechanisms
 - not all possible traces can be seen

- Debugger
 - breakpoints to pause execution
 - when execution reaches a certain point (address)
 - · when specified memory is access or modified
 - examine memory and CPU registers
 - modify memory and execution path
- Advanced features
 - attach comments to code
 - data structure and template naming
 - track high level logic
 - file descriptor tracking
 - function fingerprinting

- Debugger on x86 / Linux
 - use the ptrace interface
- ptrace
 - allows a process (parent) to monitor another process (child)
 - whenever the child process receives a signal, the parent is notified
 - parent can then
 - access and modify memory image (peek and poke commands)
 - access and modify registers
 - deliver signals
 - ptrace can also be used for system call monitoring

- Breakpoints
 - hardware breakpoints
 - software breakpoints
- Hardware breakpoints
 - special debug registers (e.g., Intel x86)
 - debug registers compared with PC at every instruction
- Software breakpoints
 - debugger inserts (overwrites) target address with an int 0x03 instruction
 - interrupt causes signal SIGTRAP to be sent to process
 - debugger
 - gets control and restores original instruction
 - single steps to next instruction
 - re-inserts breakpoint